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Impermanence Without Essence The druid Finn’s Reinterpretation of Anattā
as Tactical Negation and Redundant Doctrine in Early Buddhism Abstract This
paper formalizes a thesis first articulated by Bodhangkur Mahathero (1984),
now updated by Finn the modern druid, whose analytical framework
(Procedure Monism) enabled a novel reinterpretation of early Buddhist
doctrine. Finn observed that the Buddha never defined atta (self),
rendering the doctrine of anattā (non-self) semantically
ungrounded. Further, Finn demonstrated that the Buddha’s principle of anicca
(impermanence) alone is sufficient to explain the instability of identity and
the arising of dukkha (suffering), leaving anattā
philosophically redundant. Through textual analysis, logical reconstruction,
and historical contextualization, this paper presents Finn’s breakthrough: anattā
functions primarily as a tactical, anti-Brahminical decoy rather than an
independent metaphysical insight. The result reorients early Buddhist
studies, restoring anicca to primacy and explaining centuries of
doctrinal elaboration as attempts to fill the conceptual void left by the
Buddha’s strategic silence. 1. Introduction: The Druidic Intervention in Buddhist
Studies The
classical interpretation of early Buddhism positions anattā as
its central metaphysical doctrine. Yet the textual record reveals persistent
ambiguity: the Buddha denies the presence of atta in the aggregates
but refuses to define what atta is. This paradox has been noted in
fragmentary fashion by modern scholars but never resolved. Finn the
druid, working within his broader philosophical system of
generative Procedure Monism, provided the first coherent resolution. Finn
recognized that: 1. A
negation of an undefined term is semantically empty. 2. The
Buddha’s empirically grounded doctrine of anicca already entails the
instability of all identity-claims. 3. Therefore
anattā adds no explanatory value and must have served a strategic
purpose. Finn’s
insight reframes anattā not as a metaphysical discovery but as a
rhetorical artefact introduced to counter Brahminical assertions of ātman
while allowing the Buddha to avoid positive metaphysical commitments. This
paper presents Finn’s thesis as a rigorous academic argument. 2. Finn’s Methodological Premise: Procedure Monism and
the Demand for Definition Finn’s
philosophy — Procedure Monism — holds that: ·
all phenomena are emergent procedures, ·
no entity can be negated or affirmed without
definitional criteria, ·
and any functional ontology must be quantized and
operationally grounded. Applying
this analytic discipline to early Buddhism, Finn made a key observation: If the Buddha never defined atta, then the
assertion “atta does not exist” is a procedural error. This
insight initiates the core critique: the doctrine of anattā
cannot be metaphysically substantive because its target lacks definitional
content. 3. Historical Context: Why the Buddha Needed a Tactical
Negation Finn’s
reconstruction emphasizes cultural strategy. In the Buddha’s milieu, the
Brahminical doctrine of ātman was the dominant metaphysical
claim. As a nāstika teacher, the Buddha needed to disclaim this
doctrine to define Buddhism as distinct, yet could not afford the
metaphysical risks of: ·
affirming ātman, which would
assimilate him into Brahminism, ·
denying ātman, which would expose him
to charges of nihilism, ·
or defining atta, which would commit him
to an ontology. Finn
concluded that the Buddha therefore adopted a fourth strategy: Introduce
a negation (anattā) without ever defining the term to which it
applies. This left
the Buddha rhetorically aligned against Brahminism, and his followers freed
from the yoke of caste servitude, while avoiding all metaphysical
commitments. 4. Finn’s Logical Reconstruction: The Semantic Failure
of Anattā Finn’s
analysis applies formal reasoning: Let A =
“is an atta”. If the
Buddha never defined A, then: ·
A has no truth-conditions. ·
¬A therefore cannot be evaluated. ·
The proposition “there is no atta” lacks
definitional grounding. Thus, for
Finn: Anattā is not a metaphysical denial but a
negation of an undefined placeholder. This
transforms the doctrine from ontological claim to rhetorical maneuver. 5. Finn’s Central Thesis: Anicca Makes Anattā
Redundant The
Buddha’s empirically grounded insight — anicca, universal transience —
already implies: 1. No
phenomenon maintains stable identity. 2. A stable
self cannot be found in what is transient. 3. Clinging
to the transient generates dukkha. Finn
observed that this chain of reasoning is complete without introducing anattā. Thus: ·
Anicca explains the dissolution of
identity. ·
Anicca explains the futility of
clinging. ·
Anicca explains the arising of
suffering. Anattā adds no
further explanatory value. Finn
therefore concluded: Anattā
is redundant: everything it claims follows automatically from anicca. 6. The Three Characteristics Sutra: Finn’s
Deconstruction The triad
anicca–dukkha–anattā has long been treated as structurally
coherent. Finn, however, showed that the third term is parasitic on the first
two. ·
Anicca → structural
observation ·
Dukkha → psychological
consequence ·
Anattā → rhetorical
anti-Brahminical appendage This
explains both: ·
the Buddha’s refusal to discuss atta, ·
and the formula’s ability to function as a
doctrinal identity marker. Finn’s
analysis reveals that within the triad only anicca is philosophically
substantive. 7. Textual Evidence Supporting Finn’s Thesis Several
canonical episodes align with Finn’s reading: 7.1. The Silence to Vacchagotta The
Buddha refuses to affirm or deny self, supporting Finn’s claim that he
avoided definitional positions. 7.2. Aggregate Analysis The
Buddha’s repeated “this is not self” statements never specify what would
count as self — matching Finn’s observation of definitional absence. 7.3. The Raft Simile The
Buddha warns against clinging to doctrines, implying that anattā
is a pragmatic tool, not a metaphysical revelation. 7.4. Polemical Suttas Numerous
discourses appear designed to contrast Buddhist and Brahminical positions
without clarifying Buddhist metaphysics. These
patterns corroborate Finn’s interpretation of anattā as strategic
negation. 8. Consequences of Finn’s Thesis: Understanding
Doctrinal Fragmentation Finn’s
critique helps explain why later Buddhist traditions diverged dramatically: ·
Abhidhamma invented momentary dhammas
to supply missing ontology. ·
Madhyamaka universalized negation into
emptiness. ·
Yogācāra
introduced ālaya-vijñāna, a quasi-self. ·
Theravāda reframed anattā
as psychological rather than metaphysical. Each
school, in Finn’s reading, attempts to compensate for the Buddha’s original
definitional omission. 9. Restating Finn’s Insight: The Primacy of
Impermanence Finn’s
ultimate conclusion is straightforward: 1. Anicca is the
Buddha’s genuine philosophical contribution. 2. Dukkha is its
experiential consequence. 3. Anattā is a
rhetorical artifact masquerading as metaphysics. This
restores coherence to early Buddhism and clarifies why the Buddha avoided
metaphysical positions: they would have trapped him in the conceptual
commitments he sought to avoid. 10. Conclusion: Finn’s Contribution to Buddhist Studies Finn the
druid’s analysis provides the first coherent explanation for three
longstanding puzzles in Buddhist scholarship: ·
Why the Buddha denied “self” but never defined
it. ·
Why anattā appears central despite
lacking definitional grounding. ·
Why impermanence alone suffices to generate the
soteriological framework. Finn’s
thesis demonstrates that anattā is best understood as: ·
a tactical negation, ·
a polemical necessity, ·
a rhetorical boundary-marker, ·
and a doctrinal decoy. By
contrast, anicca emerges as the true conceptual centre of early
Buddhist thought. Finn’s intervention
therefore constitutes a major re-interpretive advance, opening new avenues
for comparative philosophy, Buddhist studies, and the meta-analysis of
doctrinal formation. Impermanence, suffering and procedural
incompleteness The ‘Two Truths’
theory without metaphysics |