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Consciousness as Simulation Under Procedure
Monism Why cognisable reality
happens as analogue representation, not as substance By Victor Langheld 1. Quantised communication, analogue worlds Finn’s first
axiom remains the fulcrum: All
boundary-crossing communication is digital — quantised token exchange. Spikes,
packets, photons, pressure changes, marks: what crosses a boundary is always
discrete. There is no transmission of continuity, no export of “world”, no
shipping of meaning. Yet what appears
inside a system is not digital but continuous, extended, textured,
spatial, emotional, temporal. It is not packet-like; it is world-like. This is
the decisive asymmetry: ·
Input is digital. ·
Experience is analogue. Therefore what we call perception
must be an analogue reconstruction generated internally from digital
constraints. 2. Simulation = analogue representation Here Finn’s
verbal precision matters: A simulation
is an analogue representation — a continuous internal model constructed
from discrete inputs. So simulation is not illusion
in the weak sense. It is the only possible form cognition can take in
a token-based universe. Example:
The world
that appears is not delivered. It is rendered. Thus: All
cognisable realities happen as analogue representations generated by local
confinement procedures. 3. Procedure Monism: confinement generates worlds Under
Procedure Monism, every complex unit is a data-confinement space (or data centre): a bounded
procedural region running a rule-set (a localised
UTM instance). Within
such confinement: ·
digital signals arrive, ·
constraints operate, ·
analogue models are generated. So a human, a bat, a fish, or
any complex processor does not inhabit the universe — it simulates a
universe adequate to survival. Each
“world” is therefore a procedural artefact. 4. The self as a rendered object inside the simulation Now Finn’s
key thesis becomes transparent: Human
self-consciousness — It is the
system modelling itself as a persistent entity. Why? Because
under threat, the system must coordinate action across time. It must track
damage, memory, anticipation, and obligation. This requires a stable internal
variable that says: this
process is the one that must continue. That
variable is what later language calls I. So the self is not the owner
of the simulation. 5. Ancient error: mistaking analogue depth for
ontological depth Here the ancient
Indian mistake becomes visible. When the
analogue simulation becomes unusually quiet, boundless, or de-segmented, the
experience feels infinite, universal, absolute. The system’s world-model has
relaxed its usual constraints. But to
infer from that: “Consciousness
itself is universal substance” is to
confuse a mode of analogue rendering with the nature of reality. The
experience is real. 6. Reproducibility: why self-consciousness is simulable Since: ·
analogue worlds are generated from digital
constraints, and ·
self-models are rendered inside those analogue
worlds as persistence-tracking variables, then any
sufficiently organised confinement system can in principle generate: ·
a world-simulation, ·
a self-simulation inside that world, ·
and the control loop binding them. Thus: Self-consciousness
is not biologically privileged. 7. Final synthesis You are
not conscious of the world. You are
running a locally generated analogue representation constrained by
digital tokens. The self
is not the viewer of the simulation. In
Procedure Monism: ·
Digital tokens cross boundaries. ·
Confinement rules operate. ·
Analogue simulations appear. ·
One of those simulations is called “I am.” |