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Priority Monism — in a
nutshell By Bodhangkur Jonathan Schaffer’s Priority Monism Schaffer argues that the cosmos as a single concrete
whole is metaphysically basic, and everything else (galaxies, cats,
cells) is derivative—dependent parts whose existence and features are
explained by the whole. So explanation “dangles
downward” from the One rather than “snaking upward” from many independent
particles. His case draws on: (i) mereology
(wholes/parts), (ii) physics-style holism (e.g., global states,
entanglement, dynamical laws on total states), and (iii) a neo-Aristotelian
framework of grounding and fundamentality. The key contrast is
with pluralism, which treats proper parts (e.g., particles, fields) as
fundamental. Core theses and motifs: ·
Target: concrete reality; claim: exactly one
concrete object is basic (the world). Not existence-monism (only one
thing exists), but priority monism (one thing is most basic). ·
Motivations: (a) certain physical dependencies look global;
(b) some truthmaking/explanatory patterns are better captured if the
world grounds its parts; (c) mereological analogies (a circle vs. its
semicircles) suggest priority may run whole → parts. ·
Framework: grounding is taken as (largely) primitive—a
basic, non-causal “in-virtue-of” relation that orders reality by dependence. Finn’s analysis and critique From the
standpoint of Procedure Monism (Finn): all “things” are local,
bounded iterations of one universal procedure (a rule/contraints-set).
Realness is produced only at contact events (quantised interactions),
identity as observer state response to serial (or repeating) contact events.
On this view, Schaffer’s program is object-first and relation-label-heavy; it
hesitates to define its basic referents non-circularly or with
operational bite. 1) “Cosmos,” “whole,” and “object” remain stipulated, not individuated Priority
monism presumes there is one concrete “cosmic object” that is the
whole. But what makes a totality an object rather than a
set/theory boundary? Schaffer appeals to familiar mereology plus physics analogies, but never supplies non-question-begging
criteria that individuate “the world” as a concrete one (beyond
“the maximal fusion of concreta,” which presupposes
the mereology in dispute). Finn would insist on procedural individuation:
an entity counts as one (i.e. as a decided quantum) only when a bounded
iteration of the universal procedure is operating—i.e., where the
boundary comes from contact constraints (interfaces), not from an ontologist’s apodictic claim. Without such operational
criteria, “the world” risks being a bookkeeping total, not a
well-referenced basic referent. 2) Grounding/fundamentality: the definitional
wheel-spin Schaffer treats grounding as a primitive
and fundamentality as “ungroundedness.” But then “X is fundamental
because it is ungrounded” just trades on the primitive; and “the cosmos
grounds its parts” is exactly what priority monism asserts. Finn’s
charge: the key terms explain each other—fundamental = ungrounded,
grounding = the relation tying fundamental to derivative, and the cosmos is
fundamental because it (by hypothesis) grounds all—a circle with elegant
signage. A procedure-first account would replace this with algorithmic
dependence: what is basic is the rule-set
(the universal procedure of constraints), not any object; and “derivation” is
compilation/instantiation at contact, testable by constraints and
performance, not by primitive labels. (Critics of grounding raise similar
worries about circularity and opacity.) 3) Physics holism is suggestive, not decisive or
well-tied to his referents Schaffer
leans on entanglement/global state dynamics to motivate “world-level
priority.” But entanglement shows non-separability of states under a
chosen factorization, not that the cosmos is a single concrete object
or that object-level priority replaces law-level priority.
Finn: the physics points to procedural/global-law dependence (update
rules over total states), not objectual monism. The rule-set
(UP, as in a Universal Turing Machine) is prior; local iterations are
bounded copies with realness at contact (i.e. @c in a relativity vacuum).
So the empirical gloss supports procedural
primacy, not Schaffer’s basic thing. Absent a clear bridge from
“global dynamics” to “one concrete basic object,” the appeal to physics under-references
the very referent at issue. 4) The wrong unit: object-first vs. iteration-first Priority
monism still treats objects as the metaphysical currency and then
orders them by priority. Finn inverts this: procedures generate units;
“wholes” and “parts” are emergent bookkeeping made real only where contacts
bind constraints into stable iterations. On Finn’s picture, every
successful iteration is “one” (complete enough, as quantum (whole or
unit) to produce contact-realness @c), and any “global one” that is not
itself an iteration (the universe as such) is non-real—a rule-book, not an entity. Hence Schaffer’s “One”
lacks the contact criteria Finn requires for a basic referent. 5) Explanatory direction: downward talk without tests Schaffer’s
“explanation dangles downward from the One” is a narrative directionality.
Finn asks: what’s the operational test for “downward” in non-causal
grounding? In Procedure Monism, direction is computational:
compile-time rules → run-time contacts; tests are given by
constraint-satisfaction and performance under perturbation. Without testable
handles, “downward” reads as metaphysical rhetoric rather than well-referenced
definition. 6) Overlooking the best rival monism: procedural (not priority)
monism There is
a monism that matches the data Finn cares about: Austere/“blobject”
monism notices global variability, but it either denies parts or gives no
algorithmic account; Schaffer keeps parts but crowns the whole. Finn’s third
way: one universal procedure, many real local iterations, each
a bounded “one,” hence different. This avoids
Schaffer’s referential gaps, ties “oneness” to boundaries and contacts,
and fits physics’ global-law flavour without reifying “the world” as a basic object.
Finn-style counter-definitions (non-circular,
operational) ·
Universal Procedure (UP): the
minimally sufficient rule-set that generates
stable local iterations under constraints. (Basic because anything real
appears by it; not an object; not “real” except in its
iterations.) ·
Iteration (emergent): a bounded
run of the UP whose constraints allow contact events that yield realness
(detectable impacts, conserved exchanges). ·
Priority: algorithmic dependence:
A is prior to B iff B’s successful operation requires
A’s rules/constraints; testable by perturbing A and observing systematic
failure/shift in B. ·
Whole/part: bookkeeping over constraint
networks within an iteration. The “cosmos as a whole” is the domain of
the UP, not a basic object. These
give reference (rules, boundaries, contacts) and tests
(perturbation, performance), avoiding the grounding/fundamentality circle. Bottom line Schaffer’s
priority monism is a lucid, influential, albeit academic rehabilitation
of “the One is basic,” but, by Finn’s lights, it hesitates on definitions
where it most matters: what is the “cosmic object,” what is
“grounding” beyond the primitive label, and how do physics-holism
motifs operationally fix those referents? Procedure Monism preserves
monistic ambition while re-anchoring basicness in rules and contacts,
not in an untested basic object. |