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Śaṅkara’s predicament 1. Śaṅkara’s goal was to reaffirm the religious
and so political status quo ante He faced
an impossible task: ·
To unify ritualist Vedic dualism (where the
world and the gods are real and distinct), ·
Upaniṣadic monism (where
all is Brahman, sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ brahma). To
reconcile the irreconcilable, he rinvented a two-truths
stratagem (first invented in later Buddhism): 1. Paramārthika-satyam — ultimate,
non-dual truth (only Brahman is real). 2. Vyāvahārika-satyam —
empirical, transactional truth (world, karma, dharma). This was
not derived from the Upaniṣads themselves,
which bluntly assert: Sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ brahma — “This whole world is
Brahman.” (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 3.14.1) That
statement leaves no remainder, no secondary level of truth. 2. His six-pramāṇa
expansion: epistemic armour plating Where
earlier thinkers like the Sāṅkhyas
or Nyāya admitted only 3 or 4 pramāṇas (perception, inference,
comparison, testimony), Śaṅkara’s
Advaita, borrowing from Mīmāṃsā,
adopted six. This
overabundance served a crucial function: it allowed him to sanction any
cognitive act that might be needed to defend his doctrine, while still
claiming all knowledge must ultimately confirm śruti
(revelation). The trick
was: ·
Acknowledge every possible means of knowing (to
seem inclusive and rational). ·
But declare that for Brahman all those
means collapse into one — śabda — which
only the Brahmin class could authoritatively interpret. Thus, six
pramāṇas created a labyrinth
of apparent reasonableness whose exit door led back to priestly
authority. 3. The political genius of the construction The
resulting system was undeniable but not necessarily true. ·
If perception or inference contradict the Veda →
they belong to the lower truth. ·
If they agree with the Veda → they confirm
the higher truth. Either
way, śruti wins. This
hermeneutic loop made Śaṅkara’s Advaita impervious
to critique — an epistemological fortress that protected the priesthood
from the nihilism of the Cārvākas (who
accepted only perception) and from the autonomy of the Sāṅkhyas
and Buddhists (who reasoned without appeal to revelation). 4. Finn’s contrastive reading From the
standpoint of Procedure Monism, this is transparent priestly
engineering: ·
Truth is procedural coherence, not
hierarchical concession. ·
The “two truths” are not two realities but two phases
of one process — local iteration and universal recursion. ·
To divide the world into “real” and “less real”
is a semantic survival device, not a discovery. Hence, in
Finn’s critique, Śaṅkara’s Advaita
survives historically because it is politically adaptive, not because
it is ontologically accurate. 5. Summary
In short,
Śaṅkara’s brilliance lay in producing a non-refutable
theology: he made contradiction impossible by redefining contradiction as
“lower truth.” The ‘Two Truths’
theory without metaphysics |