The Long Attempt to Name the One

Monism as Increasing Descriptive Resolution: From Intuition to Procedure

By the druid Finn

 

What you are pointing to is not the evolution of a belief, but the gradual improvement of descriptive resolution applied to a single, recurring intuition.

Across history, a small but persistent number of thinkers across many cultures have arrived at a striking and counter-intuitive sense: that the immense diversity of the world does not arise from many ultimate sources, but from one underlying reality whose nature is not directly accessible. This intuition appears long before the language, science, or conceptual tools exist to explain it properly. What changes over time is not the intuition itself, but our capacity to describe it with increasing clarity.

This essay traces that pattern. It treats monism not as a doctrine that slowly “won,” but as a recurring insight that has been repeatedly reformulated as human observational and explanatory tools improved.

 

1. The monistic intuition comes first

The intuition of unity appears early and unexpectedly. It arises not from theory, but from reflective confrontation with experience itself: the sense that explaining the world in terms of separate, independent principles ultimately fails.

Around 500 BCE, Heraclitus observed:

“Listening not to me but to the Logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one.”

Heraclitus did not deny change or difference. On the contrary, he emphasised flux and opposition. Yet behind this restless movement he perceived a common ordering principle. He could see unity, but he could not yet explain how unity produces diversity.

The same intuition appears with striking clarity in the Upanishads:

“In the beginning, this was Being alone, one only, without a second.”
(Chāndogya Upanishad 6.2.1)

And again:

“That which is the subtle essence, this whole world has that as its Self.”
(Chāndogya Upanishad 6.8.7)

Here, the One is named Brahman, but it is explicitly said to be beyond qualities, attributes, and ordinary thought (nirguna). The insight is firm; the explanation remains out of reach.

This pattern repeats: the intuition arrives before the tools.

 

2. Early limits: unity without mechanism

Because early cultures lacked systematic science and discrete measurement, they were forced to rely on broad metaphors: substance, being, fire, water, breath, spirit. These metaphors pointed in the right direction but could not explain how the One becomes the many.

Parmenides concluded that reality must be one and unchanging, and that multiplicity belongs to appearance alone. Classical Vedānta preserved unity by treating the world as māyā, appearance rather than full reality. These approaches protected the intuition of oneness, but at the cost of sidelining the everyday world.

This was not philosophical error so much as descriptive constraint. Without concepts such as process, iteration, or quantisation, unity and multiplicity could not yet be reconciled.

 

3. Compression as a recurring pattern: polytheism to monotheism

A helpful analogy comes from religious history. Early polytheism named many gods because the world appeared governed by many independent forces: storms, fertility, war, disease. This was a practical descriptive response to limited understanding.

Over time, a compression occurred. In ancient Israel, this took a radical form:

“Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one.”
(Deuteronomy 6:4)

This was deeply counter-intuitive. It collapsed creation and destruction, order and catastrophe, into a single source. Many resisted it precisely because it violated everyday intuition. Yet it endured because it simplified explanation rather than multiplying causes.

The same logic of compression appears repeatedly in intellectual history.

 

4. A scientific parallel: from astronomy to cosmology

Ancient astronomy imagined a layered universe: Earth below, heavens above, each governed by different rules. As observation improved, this distinction collapsed. The same physical laws applied everywhere.

Modern cosmology pushed compression further still. The Big Bang model proposes that all observable structure emerges from a single origin event, the cause of which remains unknown. As Stephen Hawking noted, this marks a boundary of explanation, not its completion.

Like monism, the Big Bang model is counter-intuitive, incomplete, and provisional, yet difficult to avoid once the evidence is considered. It explains more with less.

 

5. Early modern monism: Spinoza’s advance and its limit

With the rise of mathematics and mechanics, monism gained new precision. Spinoza wrote:

“Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.”

For Spinoza, God or Nature (the druid Finn’s “No God but Nature”) is a single substance, and individual things are modes of that substance. This eliminated transcendence and dualism. However, Spinoza’s system remained largely static. Substance expresses itself, but it does not iterate. Change and finitude are described geometrically rather than operationally.

Once again, the intuition advanced ahead of its descriptive machinery.

 

6. Process philosophies: movement without full constraint

Later thinkers, such as Alfred North Whitehead, tried to restore dynamism:

“The many become one, and are increased by one.”

Here, reality is understood as events rather than things. This was a genuine step forward. Yet even process philosophy lacked a clear account of constraint, discreteness, and termination. Becoming was affirmed but not yet modelled with precision.

 

7. Procedure Monism as a contemporary attempt

The druid Finn’s Procedure Monism belongs to this long lineage. It does not claim to reveal what the One is in itself. Instead, it proposes a model for how unity can appear as multiplicity using contemporary concepts: procedures, rules, constraints, iteration, and quantisation.

In this view:

·         The One is not a substance but a generative rule-set.

·         The many are not illusions but outputs.

·         Identity is temporary and functional.

·         Error and misrepresentation are unavoidable features of finite systems.

Why Procedure Monism is a genuine upgrade

Procedure Monism does something historically new: It replaces substance language with execution language.

Instead of asking what the One is, it asks:

·         what rules (i.e. constraints) must exist for anything to appear at all?

·         how can identity emerge without violating unity?

·         how can discreteness arise without dualism?

And it seeks to explain:

·         why identities are temporary,

·         why illusion is structural,

·         why suffering arises from misalignment,

·         why freedom is procedural, not metaphysical.

This approach replaces older metaphors of emanation or substance with the language of execution and process. This is not mystical refinement.
It is descriptive precision enabled by modern science, specifically that of computation, systems and quantum theory.

Crucially, it remains provisional. Like Niels Bohr’s early atomic model, it is offered as a useful approximation, not a final description.

 

8. One intuition, many models

Seen this way, Monism is not a single doctrine competing with others. It is a recurring insight that repeatedly forces thought toward unity whenever explanatory complexity becomes excessive.

What evolves is not the intuition itself, but our ability to describe it without mythology or contradiction. Each era builds the best model it can with the tools available. Future eras will build better ones.

The One remains essentially unknown.
Only our descriptions improve.

Procedure Monism is best understood in that spirit: not as an endpoint, but as the current attempt to say clearly what has been glimpsed by a rare few, again and again, for millennia.

 

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